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COMMENTS
TAXATION OF THE URANIUM INDUSTRY:
AN ECONOMIC PROPOSAL

In recent years, the uranium industry has been the benefactor of
considerable special interest legislation. This legislation has had the
effect of significantly reducing the industry's tax burden. More
recently, however, the hue and cry has been raised not only to
restore taxes to their former levels, but also to levy a substantially
increased tax burden in order to provide New Mexico with its fair
share of the revenues accruing from its uranium resource which is
largely extracted by giant corporations for consumers in other states.
This note makes a recommendation for tax reform with respect to
the mineral extraction taxes which fall on the uranium industry. The
recommendation is based on considerations of existing problems in
the tax structure and an economic comparison of New Mexico and
its chief competition in the uranium industry in Wyoming. Considerations of the current tax structure are largely addressed to defining a
sensible, viable tax base for the different taxes in the mineral extraction tax structure. Economic considerations made are related to a
determination of that tax burden levied by the state on the uranium
industry which will maintain New Mexico's competitive advantage
over Wyoming and yet maximize revenues to the state. By maintaining our competitive advantage, development will not be significantly impaired. If the tax base is defined, and the tax burden is
determined, the tax burden can then be allocated among the various
taxes to determine tax rates.
What should New Mexico's tax policy be with respect to the
uranium extraction industry located within the state? The state is
limited in its options insofar as general public policies and legal
restraints manifest a preference for mineral extraction to be a function of private enterprise. Furthermore, it is recognized that private
enterprise must be able to operate at a profit in order to operate at
all. The latitude remaining to the state in the exercise of its tax
power should be subject to rational economic and political considerations. The exercise of the taxing power or changes in its exercise
should be preceded by a rigorous consideration of these economic
and political considerations. As a framework upon which such an
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examination may be made soundly, the following questions should
be answered:
A. What is the existing tax structure?
B. What are the objectives to be served by any changes in the tax
structure?
C. What changes are proposed?
D. What benefits will accrue to New Mexico as a result of these
changes?
E. What will be the impact of these changes on the uranium
industry?
The first two questions can be answered without consideration of
specific proposals but the latter three questions must be answered
with respect to each change.
THE EXISTING TAX STRUCTURE
The best expositions of New Mexico taxation of the extractive
industries have been put forward by Anne K. Bingaman' and
Franklin Jones2 in two separate articles. Since the appearance of
these discussions, several developments in the mineral tax structure,
particularly with regard to the uranium industry, have occurred,
making the subject of these studies even more relevant today. The
treatment in the cited articles applies to all hard mineral extraction,
the consideration in this note is limited to uranium extraction thereby restricting the generalized principles considered in the cited
articles to the unique situation of uranium.
The mineral extraction tax structure as it applies to the uranium
industry consists of the severance tax, the natural resources excise
tax, and a tax on mineral property and mining equipment and
improvements.
Those taxes have been subject to numerous revisions since their
enactment. In some cases, legislative revision of the tax laws has
resulted in confusing and arbitrary provisions being built into the tax
structure. Consequently, at present, the mineral extraction tax
structure as it applies to the uranium industry is difficult for the
state to administer. Furthermore, while most of the tax revisions
have been in the taxpayer's favor, these changes have increased the
difficulty of compliance substantially.

1. Bingaman, New Mexico's Effort at Rational Taxation of Hard Mineral Extraction, 10
Nat. Res. J. 415 (1970).
2. Jones, The Struggle for Equitable Taxation of Mines-the New Mexico Example, 16
Rocky Mountain Min. L. Inst. 463 (1971).
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The Severance Tax
The severance tax3 is levied for the privilege of severing natural
resources. 4 The underlying theory is that the extractive industry
must pay a tax to the state for its removal of the mineral resources
which, in part, constitute the natural heritage of the people of the
State of New Mexico. The severance tax is designed to yield a tax
due by applying a statutory rate to a statutory base. The severance
tax was enacted in 1937,' but it was not until 1951 that uranium
6
was specifically listed in the schedule of tax rates. At that time it
was taxed at a rate of 1/8% of its defined tax base. In 1957, the rate
was increased to 1/2% of the tax base. 7 In 1961 the rate of the
severance tax on uranium was again increased from 1/2 to 1% of the
tax base. 8 Today the rate still stands at 1% of the tax base valuation.
The history of the tax base has been more dynamic than the tax
rate, with the trend being to reduce the tax base. At the time of
enactment, the tax base of the severance tax for all taxed minerals
was the ". . . value of such products severed and saved from the soil
of this state and shall be paid at the following rates: ...The value of
all such production shall be computed as of the time when and the
place where the same have been severed or taken from the soil
9
immediately after such severance." In 1949, the tax base became
"gross value as herein after defined" and an allowable annual deduction of $200,000 per taxpayer was created.' 0 In addition, gross
value was defined as market value less costs of hoisting, crushing and
loading necessary to place the severed product in marketable form
for those severed materials which were not beneficiated before sale.
Materials requiring beneficiation were valued at the proceeds of the
first sale after beneficiation less freight charges subsequent to severance to the point of the first sale and the cost of processing or
beneficiation.' ' In 1961, deductions for costs of hoisting, loading
and crushing were limited to 50% of reported value.' 2 This ended
the erosion of the tax base through explicit amendments to
§ 72-18-2; the revisions in the severance tax base which were to
follow took the form of new statutes. In 1971, a statute allowing
deductions from gross value for rentals or royalty payments made to
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 72-18-1 et seq. (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1975).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-1.2 (Supp. 1975).
5. See History notes to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-1 (Supp. 1975).
6. See Amendment notes to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-2 (Repl. 1961).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 7

the United States or the State of New Mexico became law.' 3 In
1972, the law was revised to allow deductions for rents or royalty
"belonging" to the United States or the State of New Mexico as
opposed to rents or royalties "made" to the United States or the
State of New Mexico." 4 Also in 1972, a new statute was passed
separately defining the gross value of uranium products. The new tax
base for uranium products became:
... the gross value to be reported for severed and saved uranium
bearing material not disposed of as ore or solution but processed or
beneficiated (other than by sizing and blending), regardless of the
form in which the product is actually disposed of, shall be the value
of U 3 O

contained in ore or solution determined on the basis of the

U3 08 ore or solution content at fifty percent (50%) of the taxpayers average unit sales price during the preceding calendar year
U 3 08 contained in the concentrate form commonly known as
yellowcake, less 50% of the reported value as a deduction for
expenses of hoisting, loading, crushing, processing and beneficiating
uranium bearing material severed and saved from an underground
mine.'

A recital of the severance tax changes does not reflect their full
impact on the revenue producing power of the tax. A hypothetical
example will illustrate this effect more clearly. The example is not
meant to reflect the actual tax paid by the industry in any given year
but is simply meant to illustrate the effect of the tax changes on the
revenue producing power of the severance tax.
For purposes of the hypothetical, the following assumptions will
be made:
a. Annual production is 1,000,000 tons of ore with an average
grade of .0025 (5 lbs. U 3 08 per ton).
b. 80% of the ore is beneficiated and 20% is sold as raw ore.
c. 5% of production is from federally leased lands for which a
royalty is paid amounting to 12% of true gross value of production from those lands.
d. 3% of production is from lands leased from Indians, for which
a royalty is paid amounting to 12% of true gross value of
production from those lands.
e. 10% of production is from lands leased from the state, for
which a royalty is paid amounting to 12% of true gross value of
production from those lands.
f. Costs of "hoisting, loading and crushing" are $8 per ton.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-4 (Supp. 1975);see Amendments notes.
14. Id.
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-2.2 (Supp. 1975).
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g. Costs of milling are $5 per ton.
h. The price of a pound of U 3 0, "yellowcake" is hypothesized to
be $8 per pound.
i. The price of a ton of unbeneficiated ore is $20.
j. For purposes of the $200,000 taxpayer exemption, there are
three taxpayers who mill their own ore and there are twenty
taxpayers who do not mill their ore but sell it outright.
k. U3 08 in ore is recovered at a rate of 100% in the milling
process.
W ith these assumptions, several shorthand computations and definiti(ons may be made for purposes of facilitating the tax computation.
a. True Gross Value is simply Price x Quantity.
1. True Gross Value for beneficiated material = [.8 x
5,000,000 pounds U 3 0 8 in ore x $8 per pound] =
$32,000,000.
2. True Gross Value for unbeneficiated ore = [.2 x 1,000,000
tons of ore x $20 per ton] = $4,000,000.
b. Costs of milling annually = [800,000 tons of ore x $5 per ton]
= $4,000,000.
c. Costs of hoisting, loading and crushing of ore sold as ore =
[200,000 x $8 per ton] = $1,600,000.
d. Royalties made to Federal and State governments (including
royalties for the benefit of Indian tribes) are computed as follows:
1. for ore that has been milled [(.12) (.2) x 32.000.0001 =
$768,000.
2. for unprocessed ore [(. 12) (.2) x 4,000,000] = $96,000.
e. Royalties belonging to Federal and/or State governments
(excluding royalties paid for the benefit of Indian Tribes) are
computed as follows:
1. for ore that has been milled [(.12) (.17) x 32,000,000] =
$652,800.
2. for unprocessed ore [(.12) (.17) x 4,000,000] = $81,600.
f. Total of exemptions at rate of $200,000 per taxpayer:
1. for beneficiated material - $600,000.
2. for unbeneficiated ore - $4,000,000.
g. 50% of last year's price of U 3 08 per pound x amount in ore
processed less 50% for costs = [(.5) ($8) (4,000,000 lbs.)j =
$8,000,000.
2
Computation of the tax on the basis of the foregoing assumptions
and definitions during the years the legislature made changes, is set
forth in Table I. The table demonstrates the effect of legislation on
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the severance tax with all parameters but legislative action being held
constant. Initially the rate of the tax was increased, thereby increasing the tax, but subsequent diminution of the tax base resulted
in a net loss of revenues.
The approach used by the legislature in varying the severance tax
reflects a lack of appreciation of sound tax policy. The impairment
of the tax base by the various deductions and exemptions has had
the effect of penalizing some and subsidizing others. For instance, to
allow companies to deduct royalties paid to the federal or state
governments results in these companies having a smaller tax base
than would the company who produced on lands which it leased
from private land owners and upon which royalties are paid. Furthermore, as requirements for revenue from the severance tax increase,
and the rate is increased to provide this revenue, the burden of the
tax increase falls on the limited base thereby increasing the disparity.
A second problem in impairment of a tax base is lack of visibility.
Visibility is that characteristic of a tax which reflects whether the tax
level is what it appears to be. If the rate of the severance tax on
uranium is 1%, and it is, it appears that the state retains 1% of the
value of uranium production whereas in reality the effective rate of
the severance tax on uranium production is actually less than
of
1% when the impairment of the tax base is considered. A third
problem is that formulating the tax base in increasingly complicated
terms, the cost of computing and administering the tax is increased
as is the margin for error and duplicity in tax reporting. To be sure,
an impairment of the tax base from gross value to something less is
justifiable if the deduction is legislatively deemed worthwhile and a
well defined tax base remains. However, distortion of the tax base to
effect tax relief is questionable tax policy.
Additionally, the severance tax statutes present problems of interpretation. The first problem arises with § 72-18-4 entitled "Deductions from gross value" which states: "In computing the amount of
tax due, rentals or royalty payments belonging to the United States
or the State of New Mexico shall be deducted from gross
value... ." ' One is immediately led to ask whether rentals and
royalties both are deductible or if the deductions are mutually
exclusive. In New Mexico, lessees pay rentals and royalties.2 0 A
second, more troublesome problem pertains to the statute entitled
"Gross value of uranium products defined" which allows the value of
U 3 08 contained in ore or solution for purposes of severance taxation
to be assessed at 50% of the taxpayer's average unit sales price during
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-4 (Supp. 1975).
20. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 7-9-22 & 7-9-23 (Repl. 1974).
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the preceding year, less 50% of this value as a deduction for expenses
of hoisting, loading, crushing, processing and beneficiating uranium
bearing material severed and saved from an underground mine.2 1 No
reference is made to open pit mines. The statute seems to lend itself
to two possible interpretations.
The first interpretation is that uranium products from open pit
and underground mines are valued at 1/2of last year's price and then
the base for uranium products from underground mines is reduced
again by 50% to account for costs of hoisting, loading, crushing,
processing and beneficiating ore from underground mines. Presumably, open pit miners incur the same costs in beneficiation and processing ore as do underground miners. Furthermore, while open pit
mines do not have to hoist their ore from the depths of the earth
from which ore from underground mines is hoisted, it seems that
crushing and loading costs are also incurred by the open pit miners.
It appears that the cost deduction for underground miners then is
arbitrary and unreasonable. This raises the question whether this
statute under this interpretation is within the taxing power of the
state government. If it is, we are left with absurd tax policy. A plain
reading of Article VIII, Section 1 of The New Mexico Constitution
implies that it is not. If it is not, and the law is challenged and
declared void, uranium valuation will be thrown back into the
of the severance tax
general definition of gross value 2 2 for purposes
2
3
clause."
"separability
the
of
basis
the
on
The second interpretation would allow uranium products from
underground mines only to be valued at 50% of last year's price less
50% of that figure for costs and uranium products from open pit
mines would be valued in accordance with the general definition of
gross value 2 4 which allows a deduction of up to 50% of gross value
for expenses of hoisting, crushing and loading but not for processing
or beneficiating the ore. The differential tax treatment under this
interpretation is twofold. Underground miners are allowed to value
their products at '/2 of last year's price and to deduct outright 50%
for processing and beneficiating, etc. Open pit miners must value
their products at current market value and must justify cost deductions up to 50% of reported value excluding costs for processing and
beneficiation. This interpretation is just as arbitrary in its treatment
of uranium miners as the first interpretation and the same problems,
therefore, hold.
21.
22.
23.
24.

N.M.
N.M.
1961
N.M.

Stat.
Stat.
N.M.
Stat.

Ann. § 72-18-2.2 (Supp. 1975).
Ann. § 72-19-2 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1975).
Laws, ch. 98, § 3.
Ann. § 72-18-2 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1975).
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Natural Resources Excise Tax
The structure of the natural resources excise tax, 2 I is considerably
more straightforward than that of the severance tax. This tax takes
one of three forms, that of a resources tax,' 6 or a processor's tax 2 7
or a service tax. 2 a The resources tax is levied on any severer of
natural resources at the rate of 3/4 of one percent for uranium, for the
privilege of severing natural resources. The tax base is the value after
severance less deductions for sales to the United States or any agency
thereof, and the State of New Mexico or any political subdivisions
thereof. The processor's tax is levied on any processor of natural
resources at the rate of 3/4 of one percent for uranium for the
privilege of processing natural resources. The tax base is the value of
the beneficiated material less the same deductions as allowed for the
resources tax. The service tax is levied on any person severing or
processing natural resources that are owned by another person at a
rate equivalent to that which would be levied upon the owners if
they had severed or processed the material themselves. The tax base
for the service tax is the service charge defined as "the total amount
of money or the reasonable value of other consideration received for
severing or processing any natural resources by any person who is not
2
the owner of the natural resources.' 9
An owner of a uranium deposit mineral interest who severs
uranium ore and sells it pays the resources tax unless it is to be
processed in New Mexico. An owner of a uranium deposit mineral
interest who severs and processes the uranium ore pays the processor's tax. A lessee of a uranium deposit mineral interest who
severs the uranium ore and sells it pays a service tax. A lessee of a
uranium deposit mineral interest who severs and processes the
uranium ore from a lessee pays the processor's tax on a tax base
reduced by the lessee's service charge. A processor who purchases ore
pays the processor's tax. Thus the resources excise tax reaches all
combinations of the extraction process, as opposed to the severance
tax which seems to allow severed uranium ore that is sold out of
state to go untaxed. 3" Admittedly, the economics of the uranium
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 72-16A-20 to 72-16A-29 (Supp. 1975).
26. Id. § 72-16A-23.
27. Id. § 72-16A-24.
28. Id. § 72-16A-25.
29. Id. § 72-16A-22.F.
30. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-2.2 (Supp. 1975) requires that the taxable event for this
section is the feeding of uranium bearing material to process whereby yellowcake is recovered. Further, the same statute requires that "gross value to be reported for severed and
saved uranium bearing material not disposed of as ore or solution but processed or
beneficiated... regardless of the form in which the product is disposed of,..." The words
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mining-milling process dictate that the ore be processed relatively
close to the mine mouth but at a high severance tax rate in New
Mexico it may become economical to build and mill in Arizona and
to ship ore from the Gallup-Churchrock area to Arizona for processing.
The only question raised by the Natural Resources Excise Tax Act
arises in the definition of taxable value, where it is stated that:
"Amounts received from selling natural resources, other than
metalliferous mineral ores, whether processed or unprocessed, to the
United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof, the State of
New Mexico or any political subdivision thereof, . . . may be de3
ducted from taxable value." " If the phrase, "whether processed or
unprocessed" refers to the words "natural resources," then sales of
U 3 08 in concentrate to government agencies are deductible because
U 3 08 in concentrate is not a metalliferous mineral ore; it is a refined
product. On the other hand, if the phrase "whether processed or
unprocessed" refers to the words metalliferous mineral ores, then
U 3 08 sales to government agencies are not deductible because U 3 08
in concentrate is a processed mineral ore. The significance of such a
deduction is de minimis at the present time because the then AEC
uranium buying program was terminated some time ago. From 1966
to 1970 however, deductions of sales to government agencies would
have been a very substantial concession.
The Property Tax
The Property Tax on mineral property presents many of the same
problems as the severance tax. The basic structure for the property
tax on uranium producing property is set out in three statutory
sections.
Section 72-29-11 defines the classes of mineral property for tax
purposes. 3 2 Mineral properites are classified as:
Class 1 productive mineral property-lands used for uranium production which are held under private ownership in fee and all
severed mineral products from such,
Class 1 non-productive mineral property-the same as Class 1 but not
productive,
Class 2 mineral property- severed mineral products from mineral
lands held by possessory title under the laws of the United
States, and
"not disposed of as ore ...

but processed or beneficiated.. regardless of the form in which
the product is actually disposed of,...," together with the denoting of milling as the
taxable event seems to imply that the severance and sales of raw ore incurs to tax liability.
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-16A-22.1 (Supp. 1975).
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-29-11 (Supp. 1975).
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Class 3 mineral property-severed mineral products from leasehold

or contract mineral rights in mineral lands, the fee of which
is vested in the United States or the state.
Section 72-29-123 3 sets out the valuation procedure of mineral
property and property used in connection with mineral property
except for potash and uranium mineral property. Section 72-29-1431
sets out the method of evaluation of mineral property and property
used in connection with mineral property when the primary production from the mineral property is uranium. Under this section,
equipment and improvements held or used in connection with
uranium mineral property are valued under the methods of valuation
required by the Property Tax Code. 3 ' Further, under this section,
the Property Tax Code would be utilized to evaluate the surface
interests for its value for agricultural purposes, etc., if such interests
are held integrally with the mineral interest.
Class one productive, class two and class three mineral property
are taxed on the annual net production value of the uranium mineral
property. Class one nonproductive mineral property is taxed on a per
acre value basis as defined by section 72-29-12E and Property Tax
Department regulations.
Two significant problems with the property taxation of mineral
lands held for uranium production are raised by the definition of
''annual net production value." The definition is divided into two.
cagetories: that of the value of uranium bearing ore disposed of as
such and that of U3 08 in concentrate. Ore valuation is simply the
sales price less 50% for expenses incurred in production. U 3 08 in
concentrate is evaluated at 50% of the taxpayer's average unit sales
price during the preceding calendar year, plus 50% of the representative sales price of all other minerals produced and saved from such
uranium bearing material, less 50% of the value for the cost of producing and bringing the output to the surface and of milling, etc.
uranium bearing material severed and saved from an underground
mine.
The first problem with the property tax is that uranium properties
receive preferential treatment. All other mineral properties except
potash are valued for tax purposes at 300% of annual net production
value while uranium properties are taxed on the value of annual net
production value only. Furthermore, annual net production value for
other mineral properties is actual annual production value, less cer33. Id. § 72-29-12.
34. Id. § 72-29-14.
35. N.M. Star. Ann. § 72-28-1 etseq. (Supp. 1975).
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tain costs and royalties, while annual net production value of
uranium is halved before cost deductions or royalty deductions are
even considered.
The second problem is that the statute defining annual net production value for U 3 08 in concentrate refers only to underground
mines. This problem was discussed earlier in reference to the severance tax. 3 6 Article VIII, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution
states that: Taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in proportion to the value thereof and taxes shall be equal and uniform upon
subjects of taxation of the same class. 3 7 Section 72-27-14 does not
make clear the tax status of uranium open pit mining property. The
first question that § 72-29-14 raises is whether or not the differential
treatment of uranium mining property relative to all other mining
property is in accord with Article VIII, Section 1 of the New Mexico
Constitution. The second question is how open pit mining property
and underground mining property are taxed under Section 72-29-14.
It appears that there is different treatment. Is this in accord with
Article VIII, Section 1?
In summary, the severance tax on uranium and the property tax
on uranium mineral lands do not serve well as revenue producers.
The erosion of the tax base of both taxes limits their usefulness.
Furthermore, if the tax rate were increased in order to derive the
revenue that should and could be derived from these taxes, the already unequal burden on taxpayers within the industry would be
increased. Even if these flaws were acceptable, surely the imprecise
language, creating problems of constitutionality as well as problems
of compliance with ill-defined statutory guidance is reason enough to
legislate a more reasonable procedure in taxing the uranium industry.
THE OBJECTIVES OF TAX POLICY
38
The Objectives of a tax policy are:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

adequate revenues,
stability,
tax consciousness or visibility,
facility in administration,
optimal development of the state's resource, and
equity

1. In 1968, the need for increased revenues was anticipated to
36.
37.
38.
York,

See text at notes 21 to 24 supra.
N.M. Const. art. VIII, § 1.
Temporary Commission on the Fiscal Affairs of State Government, State of New
1 A Program for Continued Progress in Fiscal Management 32 (Feb. 1955).
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forestall a deficit of some seven million dollars. 3 9 It was hoped that
at least part of the needed revenue could be derived from increases in
taxes on the extractive industries.4 0 Instead, the taxies levied on the
uranium industry have been dramatically reduced since 1968. The
reduced tax burden on the uranium industry may have been justified
by the then existing business environment. The period was one of
reduced buying of U3 0, by the Atomic Energy Commission and
simultaneously there existed a milieu of stagnating prices. And, not
unexpectedly, legislation hastily drawn up to provide immediate tax
relief often overlooks incidental effects whose impacts outlive the
original needs for which the legislation was drafted. The situation has
changed dramatically for the uranium industry since the doldrums of
the late sixties. Prices are now rising at a rapid rate and the anticipated demand will push the uranium industry to its production
capacity. Consequently it is time to correct problems existing in the
present tax structure and to determine how much of an increase in
the tax rates will be necessary for New Mexico to obtain its fair share
of revenues generated by uranium production.
2. The objective of stability in the extractive taxes requires
consideration of the fundamental mechanism of the tax itself. The
tax consists of a base which determines what will be taxed and a rate
levied on the base which determines how much tax is paid. A very
broadly based tax such as the gross receipts tax will generate large
amounts of revenue at relatively low rates. The tax burden is widely
distributed over the base and the disparities of the impact of the tax
burden in absolute terms are thereby reduced. Furthermore, to increase or decrease revenues substantially requires a relatively modest
increase in the tax rate (assuming the same tax base). A tax of this
nature is said to be stable in that important revisions in the law to
accommodate changes in tax revenue requirements are unnecessary.
On the other hand, if the tax base is substantially reduced by
exemptions and deductions of various sorts (such as exists in the
federal income tax structure), the tax rate on the tax base would
necessarily have to be higher to produce the same revenues as would
a broader based tax with a lower rate. Furthermore, this requires a
larger burden to be shouldered by those taxpayers who do not
qualify for the exemption and deductions that are allowed. (This is a
common complaint with the federal income tax by the middle
income taxpayer.) Also, to increase or decrease revenues by a given
amount requires larger increases or decreases in the tax rate on such a
reduced base than would be required on a more broadly based tax.
39. Jones, supra at 463.
40. Id.
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A further problem created by allowing exemptions and deductions
which impair the tax base is that it violates the equity principle as
well as the stability principle of sound tax policy. For example, a
deduction from the severance tax base for royalties payable to Indian
Tribes would subsidize Anaconda and Exxon, the producers, who
happen to lease tribal lands. Furthermore, the amount of this subsidy
would have to be made up from producers on non-Indian lands if a
specific revenue requirement existed for the severance tax. Naturally,
there are situations where such subsidies are justified but the subsidy
should be acknowledged and justifiable as opposed to incidental.
Stability of a state's tax structure is thought to be so vital to tax
policy' that it has been suggested 4 that in considering location or
expansion in a certain taxing jurisdiction, the tax level is not as
important as stability of the tax structure. The rationale of this
suggestion is that the tax level reflects the level of services offered by
the state government such as fire protection, police protection,
transportation facilities, etc., whereas an unstable tax structure,
where the tax burden is fluctuating with the annual needs of the
state, adversely affects the firm in fiscal planning and results in
liquidity costs or cash flow problems.
3. The visibility or tax consciousness objective requires that the
tax be straightforward and well-defined. It requires that subsidies and
disparities in tax burdens be recognized, justified and acknowledged
rather than surreptitiously enjoyed by the recipients of such benefits.
Visibility is best served by a broadly based tax with minimal exemptions and deductions. A tax with no deductions or exemptions
by definition is more simple, straightforward and understandable.
Nevertheless, equity may demand certain modifications to the tax
base. On the other hand, the tax base for uranium under the present
severance tax fits the now famous quote of Senator Lowell Weicker
of Connecticut: "This bill defies human understanding let alone
senatorial understanding."
4. If a tax structure succeeds in achieving the objectives of stability and visibility, then it will be more easily administered than it
would otherwise be. Stability implies longevity of life for the tax
structure. With this longevity comes the solutions of problems in
disputed areas, as well as, the familiarity of taxpayers and administrative personnel with the tax procedures. Visibility also contributes to
ease of administration in much the same fashion. A well defined tax
41. Jones, Taxation and Industrial Location, 23 N.M. Business, No. 6, 1 (1970); see
Muir, Ad Valorem Tax Status of a Private Lessee's Interest in Publicly Owned Property:
Taxability of Possessory Interests in Industrial Projects Under the New Mexico Industrial
Revenue Bond Act, 3 N.M. L. Rev. 136, 165 (1973).
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reduces the areas of dispute available for taxpayers and tax collectors
to exploit.
5. Optimal development of the state's resources as an objective of
tax policy suggests a tax structure for the uranium industry which
would foster the exploration and development of the uranium in
New Mexico in an orderly fashion. A tax levied on an extractive
industry such as the uranium industry may affect a firm's decision
making process regarding the rate of recovery (how much ore is
2
extracted from the mine per time period) and the level of recovery"
(how low a grade of mineral will be extracted from a given deposit
and the percentage recovery from the milling process). The resource
may be extracted at such a rapid rate as to induce boomtown development syndromes and then exhaust the mineral before the
developed area had developed a sufficiently strong economic base to
sustain itself. It may be that problems of this nature can be solved by
retardation of the rate of extraction through tax policy. On the other
hand, retardation of the rate of exploitation of a resource may cost
the state more in lost collateral revenues such as income tax and
gross receipt tax revenues.
6. Equity requires that tax differentiation among taxpayers be
based on a reasonable classification. The reasons for differential
taxation must be relevant to the rationale of the tax. For instance,
the most relevant criterion for differentially taxing income tax
payers would be income. Similarly, for the severance tax, the taxpayers would be differentiated by the amount of mineral that the
taxpayer severed. The natural resources excise tax, which is levied for
the privilege of doing business in New Mexico, differentiates between
taxpayers on the volume of business. The property tax levied to
provide local government revenues differentiates among taxpayers by
the amount of property owned by the taxpayer.
Equity to the taxpayer has a dual nature, that of horizontal equity
and that of vertical equity. Horizontal equity means that taxpayers
in the same position will be treated similarly. For income tax purposes, individuals with equal income pay equal taxes; for natural
resources excise tax purposes, firms with the same volume of business pay the same tax and so on. Vertical equity requires that taxpayers in different positions will be taxed in such a manner that the
relative impact of the tax will be the same. For income tax purposes,
if a taxpayer who has income of $10,000 pays ten percent of his
income in income taxes, then a taxpayer with an income different
42. Jones, Equitable Taxation ofMines, supra at 468.
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from $10,000 also should pay ten percent of his income in income
taxes.
In a broader context, equity considerations must go beyond the
mere consideration of the taxpayer to determine who actually bears
the tax burden. This is referred to as the tax incidence. The tax
burden is removed from the shoulders of one taxpayer to those of
another by tax shifting. For instance, in the situation of a gross
receipts tax, the vendor of goods and services is the taxpayer but the
incidence of the tax burden is said to be shifted primarily forward to
the vendee, but partially backward through reduced sales. The incidence of a tax is a very elusive concept, nevertheless, some account
must be taken of it in attempting to forge a stable tax policy.
THE PROPOSED TAX CHANGES
The proposed changes will be discussed in the following order: (1)
changes in the tax base of the Severance Tax, Natural Resource
Excise Tax, and Property Tax; (2) determination of the tax burden
to be levied by the three taxes; and (3) allocation of the proposed
tax burden among the several taxes in order to determine rates of
each of these taxes.
Tax Base Changes
The Severance Tax: The severance tax is levied for the privilege of
severing a mineral from the state and thus reducing the value of the
state's tax base or the natural heritage of the people of the state. If
the resource were exploited by the state, the returns would be the
profits obtained from exploitation, and such profits would be based
upon the total ore the state chose to exploit. Similarly, if the state
chooses instead the severance tax as the vehicle for deriving revenues
from its natural resources, the maximum tax that could be levied
would be that level which would tax away all profits. The simplest
way to do this would be to tax away gross profits (revenues less
costs). If the tax level were greater than the profit level, the firm
would cease operating. The conclusion to be drawn from this, then,
is that gross profit (revenue-costs) should be the tax base for the
severance tax. The allowance of the deduction of costs from the tax
base leaves a tax base which represents the value that could be derived by the state if the state exploited the resource itself. Further,
this yields a modicum of horizontal equity in that were costs not
allowed, those firms encountering marginal ore deposits (low grade
of ore, deposits located at great depth, etc.) would be forced to pay a
greater percentage of gross profits than would firms exploiting more
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favorably situated ore bodies. By allowing costs to be deducted, this
problem is eliminated and the value remaining in the tax base would
be exactly what the state would earn if it fully exploited each
deposit.
Nevertheless, there are arguments based on the theory of the firm
for limiting cost deductions. A mining firm will attempt to maximize
the present value of its future profit stream. Classical economic
theory suggests that, other things being equal, a miner will maximize
the present value of its profit stream by mining the richest ore bodies
first. In an environment of rising prices and rising costs, the picture is
altered. If the rate of increase in price is greater than the rate of
increase in cost and the difference in the profits returned in one year
and those returned in the preceding year represents a greater return
than would be had by the same investment at the prevailing interest
rate, then the present value of future profits streams will be maximized by extracting the poorest ores that are economical first. 4 '
In actual practice an ore body is valued by determining that ore
grade which will yield enough recoverable mineral to pay for its
extraction and processing costs. All ores above this grade are considered minable. The ore that is considered minable is extracted from
that deposit regardless of grade. This is done primarily because
leaving a high grade or low grade ore in a deposit depending upon
whether low grading or high grading conditions exist requires continued maintenance of the mine, a cost which otherwise might not be
incurred. Once, however, the ore leaves the mine, the choice as to
grade utilized once again is made for processing. The average grade of
ore fed to the mill will reflect the firm's belief in whether low
grading or high grading conditions are in the offing.
In the case of uranium, it is anticipated that the price-cost differential will continue to increase in absolute terms. And it is anticipated that the annual increments to the price-cost differential
would represent a higher return than would be obtained if invested at
the prevailing interest rate. This means that the uranium industry will
be mining the lowest grade ores first and, if full cost deductions
are allowed, the full cost of mining, milling, etc., of low grade ores
will be deducted. Since these costs make up a relatively higher percentage of the gross value of production than would the costs of
higher grade ores, this would have the effect of reducing the tax base.
In order to limit the effect of this reduction in the tax base, a limit
of 50% of the value of yellowcake produced should be the limit
allowed for cost deductions. This has the effect of guaranteeing the
43. See Appendix 1.
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state a viable tax base and source of revenue, whereas allowed unlimited cost deductions introduces the possibility of a zero price-cost
differential and thereby dissolving the tax base. The cost limitation
has the further impact of rewarding efficient producers and penalizing inefficient producers. It does introduce a degree of horizontal
inequity by taxing producers of uranium who encounter favorably
situated ore less heavily than those who encounter ore that is more
expensive to mine or mill. However, by only allowing deduction of
costs up to 50% of the gross value of production, the horizontal
inequity problem is reduced substantially more than would be the
case if no cost deductions were allowed. In the balance, it must be
concluded that the state's need for a secure viable tax base outweighs
the minimal horizontal inequity of limiting cost deductions.
A further argument against allowing cost deductions from the tax
base for the severance tax is that assuming that the tax is fully
shifted forward, implying an increase in price exactly equal to the
per unit tax, the high cost producers are in effect receiving price
subsidies. They not only are passing the tax on but also are deriving
the benefit of the cost deductions. By having higher costs the tax
paid per pound of U 3 08 is less than the tax paid per pound of lower
cost U3 08. Consequently, when the price of U 3 0. is increased to
shift the tax, the high cost producer is not required to increase his
price as much as the low cost producer, making his product a more
attractive bargain. If the high cost producer does increase his price to
equal the increased price of the low cost producer, the difference in
this price and the lower price which would just pay for the high cost
producer's tax represents a price subsidy. Alternatively, to disallow
cost deductions would be to allocate the tax burden through the
discovery process. The firm which discovers the most favorable ore
bodies, already occupying an advantaged position, would have their
advantage reinforced through the tax policy. Thus, limiting cost
deductions to 50% of gross value strikes a balance between creating
price subsidies for the inefficient producer by allowing such deductions and penalizing the developers of marginal resources by disallowing such deductions.
Producers are currently allowed a deduction for royalty payments
belonging to the state or federal government. 4 4 The exact rationale
for such a deduction is not clear, but there are three possibilities. The
deductions may be allowed in order to subsidize certain producers,
or to encourage development of government (both state and federal)
lands, or to avoid problems of intergovernmental immunity from
44. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-18-4 (Supp. 1975).
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taxation. None of these possibilities are adequate justification. The
primary uranium firms producing in 1975 were Kerr McGee, United
Nuclear, Anaconda, and Rancher's Exploration and Development.
The firms entering the market are Phillips, Sohio, Gulf and Exxon. It
is difficult to see any rationale for subsidizing firms of this size. The
returns that are awaiting the uranium entrepreneur must be handsome indeed to attract such development attention. If the returns are
that good, then it would not be necessary to encourage development
of uranium laden lands, the profit motive will suffice. Intergovernmental immunity from taxation is simply not a problem. It is well
settled that state excise taxes and ad valorem taxes on gross production, which fall upon the product derived from land leased from the
government is a tax on the lessee's interest and is not a tax upon the
lessor's interest. 4 s
Thus, there is no justification for continuing such deductions.
Sound tax policy requires that unreasonable deductions from the tax
base be eliminated. Consequently, a second recommendation for
revising the Severance Tax Act is to repeal the statutory deductions
allowed for royalty payments to the state and federal governments.
One further consideration regarding the tax base is that the taxable event for purposes of the severance tax is the beneficiation
process. Thus, the tax base may not include unmilled ore. As suggested earlier, a question presently exists as to the taxability of
unmilled ore that might be milled out of state. If the taxable event
were the actual severing of the ore from the earth, and U3 0, was
valued at the average sales price of the firm during the calendar year
for which the tax is being paid, then the taxability of unmilled ore
problem would be resolved. It is recommended, therefore, that
severance of the ore be the taxable event rather than the beneficiation process.
Summarizing the tax base recommendations, the tax base should
be the gross value of U 3 08 in ore valued at the taxpayer's average
unit sales price during the period for which the tax is applicable. This
should include all ore whether milled or not, thus making the extraction itself the taxable event. The only deductions from the tax base
that should be allowed are costs, and they should be limited to 50%
of gross value.
The Natural Resources Excise Tax: New Mexico resource excise
tax act does not present nearly as many problems as the severance
tax. The two problems that do exist with its tax base are: first, the
allowance of deductions for royalties paid to the United States, its
45. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
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agencies or instrumentalities (including Indian tribes and pueblos),
and the state; and, second, the allowance of a deduction for sales to
government. Presumably, the allowance of deductions for royalties
once again involves the question of inter-governmental tax immunity.
Since the natural resource excise tax is levied for the privilege of
severing or processing, etc., it is levied on the firms in the industry
and payable by them. The incidence of the tax may be partly borne
because of industry shifting of the burden by the government or the
Indians or the state, but it would be difficult to find a tax whose
incidence ultimately didn't, in some way, fall on one of these
entities. It is logical, however, to distinguish those taxes which fall
directly upon one of these entities and those taxes which fall indirectly by shifting of the tax burden. Only the former should be
considered for purposes of intergovernmental immunity. Consequently, for these reasons, as well as, those discussed earlier with
reference to the same deduction to the severance tax, the sales and
royalty deductions should be disallowed.
This leaves the proposed tax bases for the severance tax and the
natural resources excise tax with one difference, the allowance of
deductions for costs. Since the severance tax is levied on the privilege
of severing natural resources and serves the purposes of compensating
(though nominally) the state for this severance, it stands to reason
that at least some part of costs should be allowed to be deducted
from the tax base since the value that the U3 08 would represent if
the state were the severer would be its value in excess of costs. On
the other hand, the natural resources excise tax is levied for the
privilege of severing or processing, etc., and therefore amounts to a
tax on doing business and the tax base should be made up of the
gross receipts of the business. The natural resources excise tax is
analogous to the gross receipts tax.
The Property Tax: The current property tax base on mineral
properties provides properties held for uranium production with
special treatment as discussed earlier. The proposed change in the tax
base for the property tax would change the valuation from its current definition to one of 300% of gross value less costs of production
thereby eliminating the special treatment. If it is assumed that costs
of production are approximately 50%, this would effectively increase
the property tax burden on annual production by a factor of six.
Determinationof the Total Tax Burden
Assuming that the problems existing with the tax bases are
resolved, it remains to determine what the total tax burden of the
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mineral extractions tax with respect to uranium should be and to
allocate the burden among the severance tax, natural resources excise
tax and the property taxes respectively.
The only state that has uranium resources which are comparable
to those of New Mexico is Wyoming. New Mexico has a distinct
advantage over its chief domestic competitor, however, in terms of
amount of U 3 0, as well as the cost of producing U 3 08. This advantage is indicated by Table II. This advantage constitutes a portion of
the economic rent that is returned to the uranium producer. To
explain why this advantage makes up only a portion of the economic
rent accruing to uranium producers requires a brief divergence to
discuss economic rent in the uranium industry before attempting to
quantify the advantageous nature of New Mexico's uranium resource.
TABLE II
46
RESERVE COMPARISONS OF NEW MEXICO AND WYOMING ORES

New Mexico
$30 Reserves

Tons of Ore
%U 3 08
Tons U 3 8

302,000,000
0.10
302,700

Wyoming
352,600,000
.07
239,000

$15 Reserves

Tons of Ore
% U3 0s
Tons U 3 0 8

115,900,000
.18
206,200

105,500,000
.10
158,000

$10 Reserves

Tons of Ore
%U 3 0 8
Tons U 3 0 8

57,100,000
.26
151,000

62,500,00
.12
73,000

$8 Reserves

Tons of Ore
%U 3 0 8
Tons U 3 0 8

44,920,000
.29
131,600

19,187,000
.17
33,800

The concept of economic rent has suffered from an acute case of
schizophrenia in economics literature. Economic rent is defined by
the subscribers of the Marshall-Mill-Ricardo definition as the excess
amount earned by a factor over the sum necessary to induce it to do
46. $30, $15, and $10 reserves can be found in U.S. Energy Research and Development
Administration, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, GJO-100(76) (Jan. 1, 1976); $8
reserve data for January 1, 1976 was only published in the aggregate of 200,000 tons of
U3 08. To approximate $8 reserves for New Mexico and Wyoming, the 1975 data was used.
U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Statistical Data of the Uranium
Industry, GJO-100(75) (Jan. 1, 1975). This data was adjusted to delete from New Mexico's
$8 reserves that amount of U3 0 8 which was mined in New Mexico in 1975. An identical
amount was then added to Wyoming's $8 reserves to restore the aggregate to 200,000 tons.
These adjustments are made to account for any change in $8 reserves due to depletion
and/or discovery in 1975.
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its work.4 The Paretian rent concept is the excess of earnings over
4
the amount necessary to keep the factor in its present occupation. 8
The first consideration is relevant to whether or not the factor is
supplied at all and the Paretian definition relates to whether or not
4 9
These concepts both
the factor's opportunity cost is being met.
economic
Presumably,
industry.
find use in analyzing the uranium
1950's
the
since
existed
has
sense
rent in the Marshall-Mill-Ricardo
prolarge
few
by
characterized
was
when production of uranium
later
and
1973
until
not
However,
producers.
ducers and many small
has the level of economic rent become so attractive that returns to
uranium producers have been able to cover certain opportunity costs
in the Paretian sense of economic rent. This is manifested by the
recent entries into the industry that have been made by firms such as
Exxon, Sohio, Gulf and Phillips. It is well known that these firms,
whose long histories have been inextricably entwined with the
petroleum industry, receive substantial economic rents from
petroleum production. Consequently, if these firms are entering the
uranium industry in New Mexico, then apparently the rents that are
anticipated in uranium production exceed those that would be anticipated in other ventures including those in the petroleum industry.
At least one of these firms also operates in Wyoming, so it must also
be reasoned that this high level of economic rent typifies the returns
to uranium producers in Wyoming as well as New Mexico.
If this is the case, and it certainly appears to be, then the natural
advantage of New Mexico's uranium resources provides a substantial
amount of economic rent over that received in Wyoming. This could
provide the basis for New Mexico's extraction tax.
Since firms, such as Exxon, require higher returns to justify their
entry into an industry, only the rent differential existing as a result
of New Mexico's naturally enhanced resource can be taxed away
without incurring the risk of impinging on the rent required by such
firms to continue operating. If the tax burden reduces profits to the
level of not meeting opportunity costs for such firms, these firms will
be operating at a theoretical loss. If, for instance, Exxon's money
was invested in an industry where the percentage return was lower
than could be had elsewhere, the stockholders might have justification to replace the company's current management. Consequently,
opportunity is a very real consideration.
On the other hand, the State of New Mexico is not bound to
provide a guaranteed return to those who exploit its resource. Yet, as
47. Wessel, A Note on Economic Rent, in Readings in Price Theory, 427 (1973).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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suggested earlier, the state must be conscious of developmental
considerations. The state's tax policy should not be a great deal more
burdensome than states with similar resources. Nor should the tax
burden on one mineral extraction process be such that potential
developers of other minerals question the wisdom of operating in
New Mexico and suffering a similar fate when their operations reach
their zenith.
A question remains and that is what would be the consequences of
taxing the "Exxons" out of the business and then allowing development to take place by smaller firms which have not institutionalized
an excessive profit margin. If smaller firms were able to afford the
high cost of entry (exploration, development, mining and milling)
without a return for nearly ten years, this would be an attractive
alternative. The more likely result of high taxation would not be the
development of the resource by smaller firms but rather the large
firms would hold their reserves and would wait for the price of U 3 08
to rise enough to make production worthwhile.
Before the tax level which would precipitate this type of problem
is ever reached, there is an untaxed surplus in the resource itself
which could provide substantial sums in the tax revenues. This brings
the natural resource differential between Wyoming and New Mexico
back into sharp focus. As Table II indicates, New Mexico has 63,700
tons of U 3 08 in 50,000 fewer tons of ore and 91 fewer deposits than
Wyoming. The fact that there is more mineral in fewer tons of ore as
well as fewer deposits implies that New Mexico has a higher grade of
uranium in fewer deposits.
These facts imply that New Mexico has a lower cost per pound of
U 3 08 than does Wyoming. It is this cost advantage that New Mexico
has relative to Wyoming which should constitute a measure of the
taxability of the uranium industry in New Mexico. This cost advantage can be calculated utilizing data from various ERDA publications. The derivation of this cost advantage must be carried through
several steps. Each step will be discussed separately and the data
derived will be arranged in a table to be used in ensuing steps.
Step 1. The first step requires the construction of a table correlating ore grade to mill recovery. This has been done by ERDA for
a limited range of grades' 0 but must be inferred for other grades
from ERDA publications."'
50. J. Klemenic, An Estimate of the Economics of the Uranium ConcentrateProduction
from Low Grade Sources 4 (1974). This provides the recovery rate for ores from .01 to .10
percent U3 08. Mr. Klemenic is the Asst. Director of the Planning & Analysis Division of
ERDA's Grand Junction Office.
51. J. Klemenic, Examples of Overall Economics in a Future Cycle of Uranium Concentrate Production for Assumed Open Pit and UndergroundMining Operations (1972). The
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TABLE III
RECOVERY RATE OF VARIOUS ORE GRADES
.25
95

Ore Grade % U, 0
Mill Recovery %

.20
95

.10
92.5

.05
87.5

.025
77.5

.01
47.5

Step 2. Since Table II represents only the amount of U3 08
present in the ore, it is necessary to calculate the amount of U3 08
that can be recovered from the ore. Before this can be done, however, the reserve data of Table II which reflects total known reserves
in New Mexico and Wyoming by forward cost must be separated into
increments of ore reserves which when added to a lower forward cost
category of ore reserve will yield the next higher forward cost
category. This data is presented in Table IV.
TABLE IV
NEW MEXICO AND WYOMING ORE RESERVES BY COST INCREMENTS
Tons of U3 0,
in Ore

Fwd. Cost

Tons of Ore

Grade

New Mexico

$8 Reserves
$10 Reserves less $8 Reserves
$15 Reserves less $10 Reserves
$30 Reserves less $15 Reserves
Total

44,920,000
12,180,000
58,800,000
186,100,00
302,000,000

.29
.16
.09
.05

131,600
19,400
55,200
96,500
302,700

Wyoming

$8 Reserves
$10 Reserves less $8 Reserves
$15 Reserves less $10 Reserves
$30 Reserves less $15 Reserves
Total

19,187,000
43,313,000
88,000,000
202,100,000,
352,600,000

.18
.09
.09
.04

33,800
39,200
85,000
81,.000
239,000

Step 3. This step will utilize the data of Table III (interpolating
where necessary) and the data of Table IV to compute the amount of
that can be practically recovered for New Mexico and
U 3 08
Wyoming.
recovery rate for ores of .25% and .20% are inferred from pages 2 and 7 utilizing the
following calculations:
.25 : 34.70 $/ton
7.303 $/lb recovered
.20 : 22-75
5.987

4.75
= 3.799

4-75 lbs recovered = 95% mill recovery rate
5.0 lbs in ore
3.799
4.0

5994.9 95% mill
recovery rate
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TABLE V
U 3 08 RECOVERABLE FROM ORE RESERVES

New Mexico

Grade

$8
[$10-$18]
[$15-$10]
[$30-$151

.29%
.16
.09
.05

131,600
19,400
55,200
96,500
302,700

.95
.94
.915
.875

125,020
18,236
50,508
84,437
278,201

$8
[$10-$8]
[$15-$101
[$30-$151

.18
.09
.09
.04

33,800
39,200
85,000
81,000
239,000

94.5
91.5
92.0
83.5

31,941
35,868
78,200
67,635
213,644

Tons of U3 08
in Ore

Total
Wyoming

Recoverable
U 0,
(Tons)

Reserve
Category

X

Recovery
Rate

Step 4. Now that it is known how much U3 08 is practically
recoverable from known $30 reserves in New Mexico and Wyoming,
the cost of production per pound of U3 08 can be computed. Table
VI demonstrates the calculation of the average cost per pound of
mining and milling U3 08 in New Mexico and Wyoming.
TABLE VI
TOTAL FORWARD COSTS OF MINING AND MILLING OF U 3 0 8
RESERVES IN NEW MEXICO AND WYOMING
USING A HIGH GRADING ANALYSIS
Forward Cost
per lb.

Pounds U3 0,
Recovered
(millions)

New Mexico
8
10
15
30
Total

250.0
36.5
101.9
39.8
427.3

2.00
.365
1.515
1.194
5.074

Wyoming
8
10
15
30
Total

63.9
71.7
156.4
135.3
427.3

.511
.717
2.346
4.059
7.633

Total Forward
Cost
(billions)

Average Cost/lb

-

5.074 billion= $11.87

Average Cost/lb = 7.633 billion= $17.86
427.3 mfllion

Forward costs do not include exploration, land acquisition and
primary development costs, but if the $1.60/lb figures are adopted
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2
these costs can be
from the Uranium Production Outlook data,
taken into consideration.
Step 5. The differential between the Wyoming and New Mexico
unit costs divided by the average cost of producing a pound of U 3 08
in New Mexico will yield the average cost advantage of producing
U 3 08 in New Mexico as opposed to Wyoming.

New Mexico 11.87
1.60 (Exploration Costs/lb)

Wyoming

17.86
1.60 (Exploration Costs/lb)
19.46

13.47
Wyoming Costs-New Mexico Costs
New Mexico Costs
19.46- 13.47
13.47

-

5.99 =44.4%
13.47

Assuming cost to be eighty percent of market value, the market
advantage will be 35.6%=36%.
The high grading analysis compares the cost of production of
Wyoming's recoverable $30 reserves with a commensurate amount of
New Mexico's lowest cost reserves. This comparison shows that New
Mexico's lowest cost reserves could bear a 36% tax before the costs
of mining and milling these reserves would equal the cost of mining
and milling Wyoming's $30 reserves. As Table V reflects, cost and ore
grade have an inverse relationship insofar as proven reserves are
concerned; therefore, the choice of mining the lowest cost reserves
will have the effect of mining the highest grade reserves. The validity
of this analysis, however, follows from the fact that if, for some
hypothetical reason such as a 36% tax, costs were to increase in New
Mexico, the uranium firms if acting rationally would be forced to
mine lower cost and usually a higher grade of ore in order to make
the break even point. If, on the other hand, costs were to drop, or
equivalently, prices increased, a lower grade (higher cost) ore would
become economical to mine.
The industry has objected to this reasoning on three grounds.
First, if forced to high grade, the ores that were left in the ground
as not being economical may never be recovered.
Second, some lower cost deposits are only economical in conjunction with a higher cost deposit. Consequently, if higher cost deposits
were eliminated, certain lower cost deposits would also be forfeited.
52. J. Patterson, U.S. Uranium Production Outlook (1976). Mr. John A. Patterson is the
Chief of the Supply Evaluation Branch, Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Production, U.S.
Energy and Development Administration. The reference is to the last two pages of a paper
delivered at the Atomic Industrial Forum, International Conference on Uranium, in Geneva,
Switzerland (Sept. 14, 1976).
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Third, Table V assumes that all reserves are recoverable at exactly
the forward cost category in which they are classified.
These objections reflect a narrow, self-interested, static view of the
underlying considerations of the analysis. The first objection may be
met by noting that if the uranium producers were able to pass the
increased costs on to their consumers then they would be in the same
position as they would have been before any cost increase, and the
necessity of high grading will have disappeared. The same reasoning
applies if prices were to increase. Since New Mexico has 50% of the
nation's domestic reserves, it is likely that the industry could pass on
the costs and, in an energy-dear environment, get higher prices.
Further, the first objection assumes all parameters constant until all
mining is completed. This is roughly a period of thirty years. Such an
assumption is contraindicated by all forecasters in the uranium
market. All forecasters predict markedly increasing prices from now
forward. This means that in a relatively short period of time, the
increased cost will be more than made up for by increases in price.
The second objection must fall with the first.
The third objection is trivial. Utilizing midpoints of $6, $9,
$12.50, and $22.50 yield an almost identical cost advantage. The
third objection would only be valid if there were uneven distributions of U3.0 8 over the entire cost range for one state but not for the
other (i.e. all of New Mexico's $8 reserves were exactly $8 and all of
Wyoming's $10 reserves were $8.01). This is simply not the case.
Consequently, it follows that the New Mexico uranium industry's
average reserves could stand a 36% tax and remain competitive with
Wyoming's $30 reserves. Inflation has taxed the industry at a substantially higher rate over the past three years but prices have more
than kept pace with inflation and it is anticipated that price will also
keep pace with other cost increases such as taxes.
Allocation of the Tax Burden
Table VII reflects the 1975 tax burden of the severance tax and
the natural resource excise tax to be .8% of the value of gross production. Dr. Gerald Boyle of the University of New Mexico's Department of Economics estimates the property tax burden to be
approximately 1% of the gross value of production. Of the 1% of
value of gross production, .3% is collected from the ad valorem
property tax on production and .7% is derived from the property tax
on equipment. As noted earlier the proposed change to the property
tax base (on production) would have the effect of increasing the tax
by a factor of six. Thus the .3% would be increased to become 1.8%.
Adding this to the .7% collected through the property tax on equip-
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TABLE VII
NATURAL RESOURCES EXCISE TAX RECEIPTS AND SEVERANCE
TAX RECEIPTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE VALUE OF
GROSS PRODUCTS 1975 53
Total Production

x

Price

10,826,593.58 lbs.

$8.06

Severance Tax Paid

Gross Value of
Production

$564,002.61

+

Gross Value of
Production
$87,262,344.25
Total Tax Burden

Gross Value of Production
$87,262,344.25

=

Severance Tax Paid as a
Percentage of Gross Value of
Production
.2%

=

Net Resource Excise Tax Paid
as a Percentage of Gross
Value of Production
.6%
.8%

$87,262,344.25

$179,946.56
Natural Resources Excise
Tax Paid

=

ment would yield a total property tax burden of 2.5% of the gross
value of production.
The proceeds from the Severance Tax are paid to the Severance
Tax Bonding Fund and when the obligations from the Severance Tax
Bonding Fund are met the surplus is paid into the Severance Tax
Permanent Fund. The proceeds from the Natural Resources excise
tax go to the general fund and the property tax proceeds provide
local governments with a share of the revenues.
Presently, the Severance Tax Bonding Fund and the Severance Tax
Permanent Fund are adequately funded, therefore it is not necessary
to alter the rate for the severance tax, it will suffice to simply alter
the tax base from the present eviscerated definition of the "Gross
Value of Uranium Products" to a true gross value of production [lbs.
of U3 08 in ore severed x average price in the year for which tax is
paid] with a fifty percent deduction allowance for costs. This would
raise the burden of the severance tax to /2 of one percent of the value
of gross production.
The tax rate for the natural resources excise tax on uranium would
then be raised to 33%. A 33% natural resource excise tax rate on a
tax base of the value of gross sales without deductions would equate
to a tax burden of 33%. Added to the proposed severance tax (1/2%)
and the property tax (2/2%) burdens, the total tax levied as a percentage of gross production would be approximately 36%. The figure
is approximate because of differences which might occur between
production and sales.
53. These figures were obtained from a presentation by Mr. Fred O'Chesky to the Legislative Energy Committee in an open hearing in April 1976.
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The foregoing represents the basic tenets of a suggestion for
revision of the extracted mineral tax structure with particular reference to uranium. Significantly, the recommendations made by the
Jones and Bingaman articles' 4 regarding utilization of the federal tax
structure of the percentage depletion allowance, were omitted. While
it is true that § 613 of the Internal Revenue Code' I offers a well
established and easily administered vehicle for state mineral extraction taxes, it does create some problems. The first problem that
arises is that by adopting a federal statute as a basis for a state
statute, the state, in effect, becomes stuck with subsequent changes
in the federal statute. A recent problem of this nature was experienced by the state when § 151 of the Internal Revenue Code was
revised, increasing the deduction for personal exemption from
$600.00 to $750.00. This revision was a de facto reduction in the
New Mexico Income Tax since the tax base for the New Mexico
Income Tax is the federal definition of taxable income. Although
this problem could be avoided by adopting the words of § 613
rather than the statute itself or the statutory definitions of "gross
income from mining" and "taxable income", avoidance of the other
problems is somewhat more difficult.
The second problem arises in the definition of gross income from
the property. While the statutory definition in § 613(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code5 6 defines gross income from mining in detail
and seemingly is in conformity with the definition of gross income in
the sense that gross income equals price x quantity, the income tax
regulations, in particular § 1.613-2(C)(5)(i) states:
In all cases there shall be excluded in determining the "gross income
from the property" an amount equal to any rents or royalties
(which are depletable income to the payee) which are paid or incurred by the taxpayer in respect of the property and as not otherwise excluded from "gross income from property."' '
This definition of gross income would once again yield a tax which
has a discriminatory tax base. Royalty deductions from the tax base
would discriminate against producers who operate on lands whose
mineral interests were owned by the producers. Furthermore, this
would reduce the tax base and therefore the revenue producing
power of the tax. Consequently, the firm's motivation to maximize
''gross income from property" for percentage depletion allowance is
constrained by royalty deductions.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See notes 1 & 2, supra.
I.R.C. § 613.
I.R.C. § 613(c).
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(i).
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Royalties amount to between 15 and 20 percent of the value of
gross production if the tax base is reduced by this amount, given a
fixed tax rate, tax revenues would be similarly diminished. Furthermore, this would have the effect of subsidizing those firms which
produce from leased property. For many of the reasons stated earlier
these are undesirable features to incorporate into our mineral extraction tax policy.
BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED TAX CHANGES
The most obvious benefit that will occur is that New Mexico will
share in the uranium boom through increased revenues. Column 2 of
Table VIII represents the estimates of revenues that would be derived
if high U3 08 production projections based on present growth trends
in nuclear power consumption are realized. Column 3 represents the
estimates of revenues that would be derived, if low U3 08 production
projections based on minimal usage of nuclear power are realized.
Column 4 represents revenues that are most likely to be derived given
New Mexico's presently planned milling capacity and if it is assumed
that the average grade of ore milled is. 15%.
TABLE VIII
PROJECTED REVENUE IN MILLIONS FOR EXTRACTION TAXES ON THE
URANIUM INDUSTRY ASSUMING A TAX BURDEN OF 30%5 8
Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

High
95.8
137.2
190.8
243.8
304.9
384.8
472.4
557.1
685.1
815.6
993.8
1,068.0
1,199.2
1,320.2
1,457.3
1,610.4

Low
98.0
137.2
185.7
258.6
320.4
356.9
369.5
338.2
398.5
440.8
492.0
500.6
511.6
537.6

Column 4
Limited
Milling Capacity
78.5
92.5
121.0
137.2
171.8

58. New Mexico Energy Institute, The University of New Mexico, Uranium Industry in
New Mexico, Report Number 76-100B, 69 (Nov. 1976). These figures were computed by
taking 30% of the value of production from the data in Table 111-12 of the report.
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An additional benefit that immediately follows from the first
consideration is tax relief. It is estimated that if the gross receipts tax
on food was removed, the state general fund would lose 30 million
dollars. This would be more than made up by the increase in the
extractive industry taxation.
IMPACT OF TAX PROPOSALS ON THE URANIUM INDUSTRY
The increased tax burden must either be absorbed by the industry
or by someone else. If it is absorbed by someone else, it may be
passed forward resulting in reduced costs for the factors of production or it may be passed on to the product consumers resulting in a
higher price to consumers. To the extent that the tax burden is
passed forward or absorbed by the industry, the state will feel some
of the impact of the tax. To the extent that the tax burden is passed
on to the consumers of U 3 08, the tax burden will be exported and
therefore is of no great concern to the State of New Mexico.
An exact determination of the ultimate incidence of the tax
burden is virtually impossible, nevertheless, some insight in this
regard can be gained from consideration of the costs of the entire
process of the uranium fuel cycle from the mine to power consumption by the ultimate consumer.
Table IX reflects that the mining and milling of uranium is 28%
of the costs incurred in producing fuel if plutonium is not recycled
and 35% of the costs if plutonium generated by the reactors is recycled. Furthermore, as Column 1 suggests, the cost of the fuel cycle
is 25% of the total costs of generation, and if mining and milling is
only 28% of the cost of the fuel cycle, then mining and milling cost
can only represent 7% of the total cost of power generation. The tax
proposal of increasing the tax burden from 2% to 36% is an increase
of 34% of the cost of U 3 08 to the immediate consumer of U 3 08. A
34% increase would represent an increase of about 2% in the total
cost of nuclear power generation. If 20% of all generated power is
nuclear then the cost increase is less than /2 of one percent. While an
exact determination of the impact this would have on the demand
for nuclear power would depend on the elasticity of demand for
nuclear power, it can be surmised, in circumstances of 6% + inflation
annually (with growth in demand for electrical power uncurtailed)
that a cost increase as small as % will have virtually no effect on the
demand for electrical power. Furthermore, Table X indicates that
the cost increase being discussed would have no effect on the competitive position of nuclear power generation relative to other modes
of power generation. Consequently, the entire cost of the tax in-
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TABLE IX
BREAKDOWN OF COSTS OF NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION5 9
Column 2

Column I
Generation Costs
Capital Investment
Operation and Maintenance
Fuel Cycle

69%
6%
25%

Fuel Cycle Costs/Dollar
Mining and Milling
Conversion to UF6
Transportation and Waste
Management
Reprocessing
Fuel Fabrication
UF6 Enrichment
Less Plutonium Cost
If Breeders are Utilized

35c
3c
4c
18c
13c
50.C
$1.23
-. 23

$1.00

crease can be passed on through each stage of the fuel cycle to the
final consumer of electrical power. This would permit distribution of
the tax burden to be spread over a much larger group thereby,
minimizing its impact. To the extent, that the ultimate consumers of
electrical power are commercial entities, their cost increases may be
passed on even further.
It appears, then, insofar as economic considerations are concerned,
that the tax increase can be passed on to consumers. In fact, this was
the position taken by the uranium industry in Colorado when increases in mineral extraction taxes were being considered. 6 0 A question remains as to how soon the tax could be passed on, it has been
argued that present contract terms are so inflexible that a tax
increase could not be passed on until new contracts are formed. 6 '
This is a novel argument when members of the industry are currently
disavowing contractual obligations on the basis of economic impossibility of performance. In the face of this consideration, little
remains of this type of argument. Typical contracting practices allow
for escalation of costs, and if such provisions are not part of a contract, then force majeure considerations may provide another means
to shift the tax burden. 6 2
It is more likely, when one considers the monopolistic position of
59. U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines Bulletin, Uranium, preprint from Bull.

667, fig. 3 (1975).
60. Colorado Legislative Council Research Publication No. 214, Mineral Taxation 93
(Nov. 1975).
61. Id.
62. The Anaconda Company exercised a force majeure clause in one of its contracts in
1975 to accommodate a problem in the supply of U 3 0 8 . Anaconda, Annual Report 17
(1975).
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TABLE X
COMPARATIVE FUEL COSTS FOR ELECTRICAL GENERATION

6 3

COSTS IN CENTS PER
MILLION BTU

SALES PRICE

COAL (DELIVERED)
13,000 BTUILB

8.000 BTU/LB

DOLLARS/TON
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00

DOLLARS/BARREL

FUEL OIL
152,000 BTU/GAL.
130,000 B TU/GA L.

5.00
7-00
9.00
I1.00
13.00
15.00
17.00
NATURAL GAS
1.030 BTU/CF
900 BTU/CF

DOLLARS/MF'
.20
.40
.60
.80
1.00
1.20

DOLLARS/LB U30,

FABRICA TED URANIUM*
FUEL
24.2
27.8
.31.4
34.8

10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
*ASSUMPPTIONS:

38.4
41.8
45.3
URANIUM FUEL COSTS INCLUDE:
25,000 Mt DAYS/TON
$3.75 PER Kg CONVERSION
$55.00 PER Kg SWU
$100.00 PER Kg FABRICATION
3.0% ENRICHMENT
.200 TAILS ASSAY

ESTIMATED 1975-1 976 COSTS
AT EQUI LIBRRIUM

CALCULATIONS DO NOT INCLUDE COST OF REPROCESSING OR
CREDIT FOR REPROCESSED FUEL.

63. Kerr-McGee Corporation, 1975 Uranium Statistics and Industry Projections, 76
(Aug. 1975).
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the uranium industry in the western states, that the resistance to
increased taxes, is not because the consequent price increases can't
be passed on but rather that the industry has already anticipated
raising the price of U 3 08 to the highest level that the market will
bear and that the tax increase will cut into the profit derived from
this powerful pricing position. If this is the case, and the tax burden
is absorbed by the industry, it must be noted that the tax was designed to equalize the average returns to uranium producers in New
Mexico to the average return of the producers in Wyoming. It can
hardly be complained that the tax is unduly burdensome when it
puts New Mexico producers on an equal footing with Wyoming producers. Table XI reflects that the uranium industry is taking advantage of the dividend accruing from New Mexico's superior quality
uranium resource. In 1974, the average content of U 3 08 in ore
produced was 12.5% higher in New Mexico than in Wyoming and in
1975 the average content of U 3 0 8 in ore produced was 28% higher
in New Mexico than in Wyoming.
TABLE XI
COMPARISON OF ORE GRADE FOR THE TWO MOST RECENT
YEAR'S
64
PRODUCTION IN NEW MEXICO AND WYOMING
%of
State

Year

Tons of
Ore

New Mexico
Wyoming
New Mexico
Wyoming

1974
1974
1975
1975

2,997,000
2,458,000
2,985,000
2,589,000

Tons
U3 0 8

Total
U3 0 8

Avg.
Grade

5,400
4,000
5,500
3,700

43%
32%
45%
30%

.18%
.16%
.18%
.14%

In summary, it appears that an increase in the tax burden on the
uranium industry will be passed on to the consumers of U 3 08.
Mining and milling costs make up less than 10% of the cost of
nuclear power generation so it is not expected that the tax increase
will affect the demand for nuclear power or, therefore, the demand
for U 3 08.
To the extent that the tax cannot be passed on, it will represent an
increase in costs to the uranium industry. Nevertheless, the windfall
profits accruing to the industry from the naturally enhanced position
of New Mexico uranium resources and the dramatic increase in U 3 08
64. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Statistical Data of the
Uranium Industry, GJO-100(75), 29 (1975); U.S. Energy Research and Development
Administration, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry,.GJO-100(76), 25 (1976).
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prices are expected to offset any undue economic burden to the
industry.
WILLIAM J. CLIFFORD
APPENDIX 1
In an environment of rising prices and rising costs and where the
increment to the price-cost differential from one year to the next is
less than the interest that would accumulate on a similar investment
at the prevailing interest rate, then it would behoove the firm to
mine its best ores first in order to maximize its future stream of
profits. If on the other hand, the increment to the price-cost differential from one year to the next is greater than the interest that would
accumulate on a similar investment at the prevailing interest rate,
then it would behoove the firm to mine its poorest ores (that are
economical to mine) first. By "economical to mine" is meant that
ore which will yield enough mineral to pay for its extraction and
processing. These points are illustrated in the example by the fact
that in Case 1, of the hypothetical below, the present value of the
future stream of profits are maximized in the first combination
where the highest grade ore is mined first. And in Case 2, the present
value of the future stream of profits is maximized in the fifth combination where the most marginal ores are mined first.
Assumptions:
a. 3,000 ton ore body: 1,000 tons of 3 lb. metal/ton of ore
1,000 tons of 2 lb. metal/ton of ore
1,000 tons of 1 lb. metal/ton of ore
b. Interest/discount rate = 10%
c. 1,000 ton/year mining capacity
CASE 1
Profits from ore bodies
Year

Price

Cost

1 lb.Iton

2 lb. Iton

3 lb./ton

1
2
3

$10/lb.
$11/lb.
$12/lb.

$10.00/ton
$10.50/ton
$11.00/ton

0
.5/ton
$1/ton

$10.00/ton
$11.50/ton
$13.00/ton

$20.00/ton
$22.50/ton
$25.00/ton

Combinations
Profit Yrs. 1 + Profit Yr. 2 (PV)* + Profit Yr. 3 (PV) = Present Value of Profit Stream
1*
2
3
4
5
6

$20
20
10
10
0
0

$11.50
.50
22.50
.50
11.50
22.50

($10.41)
(.45)
(20.36)
(.45)
(10.41)
(20.36)

1 (.82)
13.00 ($10.64)
1 (.82)
25.00 ($20.47)
25.00 ($20.47)
13 (10.64)

$31.23
31.09
31.18
30.92
30.88
31.00
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CASE 2
Profitsfrom ore bodies
Year

Price

Cost

1
2
3

$10
12
14

$10.00/ton
$10.50/ton
$11.00/ton

1 lb.1ton
0
$1.50/ton
3/ton

2 lb. lton

3 lb. Iton

$10.00/ton
$13.50/ton
17/ton

$20.00/ton
$25.50/ton
31/ton

Combinations
Profit Year I + Profit Year 2 (PV) + Profit Yr. 3 (PV) = PV of Profit Stream
1
2
3
4
5*
6

20
10
10
10
0
0

$13.50
1.50
25.50
1.50
13.56
25.50

($12.21)
(1.36)
(23.07)
(1.26)
(12.21)
(23.07)

*Present value of profit stream is maximized.

$ 3
17
3
31
31
17

(2.46)
(13.91)
(2.46)
(25.38)
(25.38)
(13.91)

$34.67
35.27
35.53
36.74
37.59
36.98

